Some programmes are designed with the intention that they be adaptive, and that work on topics be facilitated between a range of stakeholders. Some politically driven designs are also explicit that work on specific topics should not be conducted through artificially established formal coalitions, and should not be projectized – that is, they should ideally not be delivered through single grant recipients. But when being implemented, they often run into trouble. In short, this is because the agents implementing the programme seem not always to be tuned in to the reasons for these kinds of design features. Too many implementing agents seem to bring a technical capability but are less well experienced to understand the intricacies of informal politics and how the project needs to be managed in such contexts.
 

There are two issue here. The first concerns adaptability. The second is the need to be flexible.

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Being Adaptive

Even though a variety of actors might seem to want the same, or a similar, change result, nonetheless the reasons for them wanting it can vary. Indeed, its normally more complicated than this – in most cases the people who work for or constitute an organisation will also have different reasons for wanting to change, or for wanting to resist change, even from their immediate colleagues. Rivalries or contests within, as well as between organisations, can be intricate, and those actors will both either want to keep certain types of knowledge to themselves, or indeed to pervade an understanding that their objectives are different from what they really are. There is nothing here that is not normal, but the implications for development facilitation are profound.
 

To begin with, bringing people together in a room, for example for a dialogue workshop (a technique that is very widely used in development work) is fraught with dangers. It is unlikely that real views will be aired, and equally likely that false positions will be advertised. For these reasons it can be much more effective to conduct facilitation and learning meetings with different actors on a more or less one-to-one basis. This will not always yield the truth – this still needs to be widely triangulated – but it is more likely to yield authentic knowledge and may be a better way of building trust.
 

Another factor is that power is commonly highly informal. So, meeting a Minister (say) in his or her office, on the presumption that that person is able to wield their formal powers, can constitute a significant mistake. Political analysis may help to reveal to the facilitator what the “interviewee’s” likely position on certain topics might be, and will help to show who actually holds or pulls the strings of action. Meeting that person in an informal setting – say over lunch or a casual drink – can then provide a better environment for the right knowledge to be communicated (both ways) and for confidences to be guaranteed. This approach to facilitation can be highly effective – both in exposing barriers to change that had not been previously seen, or in catalysing a new strategy or realisation that can tip the balance of change.
 

The process can then progress, sometimes quite rapidly, as knowledge is gained – and shared discretely – and strategies altered as these circumstances evolve. Change IS A POLITICAL PROCESS, and from this angle so a development project must weave its way delicately and yet supportively and positively through the maize.
 

Given this understanding it may be seen that doing things the wrong way can be highly disruptive. One example above is that relying on broad inclusion in workshop type meetings or seminars can actually be counter-productive – though not always so. Other examples include attempting to drive change through promoting external expectations linked with money – an approach miscommunicated through the oft-used term “leverage”. It is almost certain that this will rub against
the real interests of certain key players, even though – in an attempt to access the funds – they may express their support.
 

Similarly, the careful use of media can be critical. There can be a tendency in development work for programmes to seek to claim credit for change results. Yet a powerful incentive for change can be to ensure that that credit is seen to accrue to decision-makers. Politicians in most cases need to look good and will be more likely to take a risk if this positive image is on offer, as opposed to being made to look bad by exposing their weakness or failings. Supporting media to tell positive stories about what solutions decision makers are contemplating can be more effective than producing stories that are meant to “hold those people to account” – the so-called democratising challenge function that civil society is told it should perform.
Some of these ideas are quite radical and tend to run in the face of common development practice. Yet they constitute the real substance of “working politically”.

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Being Flexible

In order for a project to be “adaptive” in this way, there is also a critical need for it to have a flexible approach to “management”. Here are some examples of ways in which flexibility can be enhanced.

 

• Some programmes have inputs-based budgets, with allocations earmarked for example for specific types of tasks. This reduces flexibility, which commonly requires a rapid response with a variety of different tasks. Perhaps TA is needed, or a media programme, a piece of dedicated research, a training course, or a public meeting, a crop trial or a piece
  of equipment or hardware. Budgets need to be able to respond to these unpredictable demands.

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• Staff also need to be flexible. If a programme employs a series of people with specific technical skills, this can prove a disincentive to move from a topic that is not working well, and this causes inertia. Generalists who are good at facilitation tend to be the better at flexible working, or an emphasis on short-term contracts can allow the programme to shift its technical abilities relatively quickly. 

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• Programmes need to be prepared to take risks. Its OK to get involved in a new topic or issue quickly, before too much time is spent trying to check whether it is likely to work. This is OK because it reduces the cost of preliminary analysis, and it allows opportunistic engagement, while if there are no grants and fixed partnerships the programme can withdraw quickly if unassailable barriers are encountered. Action is fast and learning is fast.

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• The log frame or results framework must be attuned to change, with indicators that permit frequent alteration, and a means of measuring outcome contribution that traces or maps the process by which variable or unpredictable results were achieved. 

 

Managing a programme this way can have what is sometimes referred to as “high transaction costs”. But if managed properly they can deliver corresponding improvements in effectiveness, and therefore better value for money. Indeed, reducing the number of collective workshops and meetings, and ensuring that support is better targeted towards activities that will gain local traction, can make development a good deal CHEAPER than conventional, technically driven interventions.

 

KDP, with its experience, can help clients to manage things flexibly, helping to keep a programme “on the political ball”, contributing to the delivery of more cost-effective results.